Baltic Sea, infrastructure sabotage zone
In eighteen months, the Baltic has concentrated an unprecedented series of dragged-anchor breaks: BCS East-West and C-Lion1 (November 2024, cargo ship Yi Peng 3), then EstLink 2 and the FEC fibres (December 2024, tanker Eagle S of the Russian "shadow fleet"). NATO launched the Baltic Sentry mission in response. The sea has become the laboratory of hybrid warfare against undersea infrastructure, attribution remaining, case by case, hard to prove.
The anchor, a weapon hard to attribute
The series of Baltic incidents relies on a banal weapon: the merchant ship's anchor. A bulk carrier or a tanker pays out its anchor, continues at reduced speed dragging it over tens of kilometers, and severs in passing any cable or pipeline it crosses. The method suits hybrid warfare: nil cost, a legal onboard tool, and an incident attributable to a breakdown or a steering error. It is this difficulty of attribution, more than the damage itself, that gives the attack its value.
Three episodes in little more than a year. October 2023: the Balticconnector gas pipeline and an Estonian cable are cut by the container ship Newnew Polar Bear. November 2024: the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 severs BCS East-West (Lithuania–Sweden) then C-Lion1 (Finland–Germany) in a single drift. December 2024: the tanker Eagle S, tied to Russia's "shadow fleet," cuts the EstLink 2 power link and several fibers. Three incidents, three ships linked to Russia or China, no firm conviction for sabotage.
The wall of attribution
NATO responded in January 2025 with Baltic Sentry, frigates, patrol aircraft and drones continuously monitoring traffic above the infrastructure. But the military riposte runs into a legal wall: in international waters, proving intent behind a dragged anchor is nearly impossible, and the law of the sea sharply limits boarding powers. In the Baltic, the aggression continues without a nameable culprit, and deterrence must be exercised without being able to name the attacker.