Trajectories

China already exceeds 80% of every solar-PV manufacturing stage and its share of polysilicon and wafers is set to approach 95% by ~2030 according to the IEA, even as cells and modules diversify slightly outside China.AIE, Solar PV Global Supply Chains, 2022 ↗

China's share of global mature-node fabrication capacity is set to rise from 29% in 2023 to 33% by 2027, while Taiwan's falls from 49% to 42%: concentration in foundational chips worsens.TrendForce, 2023 ↗

Nickel refining concentration is intensifying: Indonesia is expected to supply about 70% of refined nickel by 2030 according to the IEA, with roughly 75% of that capacity controlled by Chinese players.AIE, Global Critical Minerals Outlook, 2025 ↗

In 2025 China accounts for ≈79% of world tungsten mine production (67,000 t of 85,000 t), with the Ganzhou cluster (Jiangxi ≈60% of Chinese tungsten) at the heart of the chain; export controls introduced in Feb. 2025 and prices roughly doubled — dependency is tightening.USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2026 ↗

In 2025 China accounts for ≈36% of world antimony mine production (40,000 t of 110,000 t, revised down by USGS) but dominates refining — Lengshuijiang the 'antimony capital'; export licensing (Aug. 2024) then the US ban (Dec. 2024) cut exports by roughly 97% and tripled prices.USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2026 ↗

Cathode precursors (pCAM) and LFP cathodes remain a near-Chinese monopoly (~95%), production the IEA describes as 'almost entirely concentrated in China' through 2030, with the pipeline of non-China projects still limited.AIE, Global EV Outlook, 2026 ↗

In 2025 China accounts for 99% of world primary low-purity gallium production (USGS); structural concentration with no significant alternative capacity despite the temporary (Nov. 2025) lifting of the US export ban — no reliable diversification projection.USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2026 ↗

In 2025 China remains the leading global producer and exporter of germanium (share often estimated at ≈60%, refinery data limited per USGS); export licensing since Aug. 2023 and a US ban since Dec. 2024, with no reliable supply diversification.USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2026 ↗

In 2025 China accounts for ≈82% of natural graphite and dominates anode material (≈90%) and graphitization (≈98%); the IEA projects 'slow' refining diversification, with the top-3 share easing only from 86% (2024) to 82% by 2035, despite emerging non-Chinese spherical-graphite lines.AIE, Global Critical Minerals Outlook, 2025 ↗

NdFeB magnet manufacturing remains the chokepoint: China (including JL MAG, the world's largest producer in Ganzhou) held 94% of magnet output in 2024, and the IEA projects that non-China capacity will cover well below 20% of demand by 2035.AIE, Rare Earth Elements, 2025 ↗

Separation/refining remains the true chokepoint: China supplied 91% of global refined rare-earth output in 2024, and the IEA projects that non-China capacity will meet only about 25% of refining demand by 2035, leaving dependence largely intact.AIE, Rare Earth Elements, 2025 ↗

In 2024, ~20 million barrels/day transited the Strait of Hormuz, about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption and more than a quarter of seaborne oil trade; no reliable forward projection, a structural chokepoint.U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025 ↗

ASML (Veldhoven) remains in 2026 the sole global supplier of EUV lithography machines — a 100% monopoly — with no credible competitor expected for a long time.CSET, Georgetown University, 2024 ↗

Interpreted as the concentration of AI-datacenter compute: Nvidia holds ~81% of the AI-accelerator market in 2025 (87% in 2024, ~75% projected for 2026), and the whole chain — Nvidia and rivals alike — depends on TSMC for fabrication and the CoWoS advanced-packaging bottleneck; concentration stays high and stable.Silicon Analysts, 2026 ↗

China's share of cobalt refining, close to 75% today, is projected at just over 60% by 2035 according to the IEA, easing slightly as Indonesian cobalt (often under Chinese control) grows.AIE, Global Critical Minerals Outlook, 2025 ↗

China held 60% of global magnet rare-earth mining in 2024 (Bayan Obo supplying about half), but the IEA projects that mining capacity outside China will meet roughly 50% of demand by 2035: the mining link is diversifying.AIE, Rare Earth Elements, 2025 ↗

MP Materials began NdFeB magnet production in early 2025 at its Texas 'Independence' plant (targeting ~1,000 t/yr, scalable to 10,000 t via the Apple and Pentagon deals), starting a partial loosening of US dependence that is still marginal at the global scale.MP Materials, 2025 ↗

In May 2025 Lynas became the first commercial producer of heavy rare earths (dysprosium, then terbium) outside China at its Kuantan plant in Malaysia, with a new Texas plant starting up, opening the first ex-China separation capacity.Mining.com, 2025 ↗

Before 2022 Ukraine supplied 50-70% of semiconductor-grade neon, but by 2023 prices had returned to prewar levels thanks to stockpiles, reduced lithography consumption and new capacity (Linde/Texas, China, Korea): the concentration is easing.CSIS, 2024 ↗

The US Army targets 100,000 155mm shells per month (up from ~14,500 before 2022 and ~40,000 by mid-2025), a goal now expected by mid-2026: Western capacity is ramping up and the chokepoint is gradually easing.National Defense Magazine, 2025 ↗

Taiwan still holds ~66% of global advanced-logic (<10nm) capacity in 2024, a share projected to fall toward 55% by 2027 as Arizona ramps, though the bleeding-edge nodes (3nm/2nm) stay in Taiwan.TrendForce, 2024 ↗

In 2025 China represents ≈58% of world fluorspar mine production (6.0 Mt of 10.3 Mt) but its mines are constrained and its imports jumped 48%; reopenings and new projects in eight countries (Mongolia, Mexico, Australia, Canada…) are starting to diversify supply — no quantified projection.USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2026 ↗

China produces about 54% of the world's steel but its share is expected to erode by 2030 according to the OECD, as Chinese demand falls (-6.9% in 2025) while India adds nearly 40 Mt of production.OCDE, Steel Outlook, 2026 ↗